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Given the enormity and complexity of Africa’s conflicts, the international community has 
realized that collaboration and strong coalition relationships can be much more effective 
in generating security and long-term stability than any one country’s individual efforts. 
Today, the international community is engaging these fragile states as international 
coalitions, using holistic approaches simultaneously to improve and build self-sufficiency 
across multiple sectors, including security, governance, economic, humanitarian aid, and 
human rights. This broader coalition approach is a departure from traditional military 
thinking of coalition operations. This thesis studies coalitions that are conducting long-
term, holistic stability operations with the premise that, if the political and operational 
environments have changed and the coalition structure has changed, then it is reasonable 
to believe that the military’s system of integration and coordination must also change. 
Using case-study analysis and interviews, this thesis argues that militaries can be more 
effective in these modern coalitions by integrating their planning efforts directly into their 
countries’ country teams or delegations. 
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Since the mid-1940s, when African countries first began earning their 
independence, Africa has been repeatedly rocked by coups, acts of terror, internal and 
external conflicts, ethnic genocide, disease outbreaks, and natural disasters. Malaria kills 
one million Africans annually and annual refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) 
flows consistently number in the millions. While only half of the continent’s 188 coups 
have been successful, they have greatly affected the political and military landscape on a 
regular basis. In addition, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda (AQ), Boko Haram, and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) are four of the more significant terrorist groups working, 
recruiting, and training on the continent today.1 
The international community at times has taken great interest in Africa, with 
interests spanning a wide range: defeating terrorism and non-state threats, investing in 
lucrative economic markets, reducing human suffering and human rights abuses, 
combating government corruption, and preventing mass migrations of refugees and 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).2 For decades the international community, as well as 
various African organizations, have tried to repair these many fragile states, but have 
only seen mixed results in achieving lasting stability. Initially, international aid was 
dominated by purely monetary assistance. Africa received a massive amount of foreign 
aid over the years—nearly $600 billion—however, there are few signs of permanent 
success.3 
Given the enormity and complexity of Africa’s problems and the lack of 
successful past assistance efforts, the international community has come to realize that 
collaboration and strong coalition relationships can be much more effective in generating 
                                                 
1 Clarence J. Bouchat, “Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach” (Strategic Studies 
Institute, January 2010), www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Percy Mistry, “Commentary: Reasons for Sub-Saharan Africa’s Development Deficit That the 
Commission for Africa Did Not Consider,” African Affairs 104, no. 417 (October 2005). 
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security and improving stability than any one country’s individual assistance. Today, the 
international community is now engaging these fragile states as international coalitions, 
using a holistic approach to simultaneously improve and build self-sufficiency across 
multiple sectors, including security, governance, economic, humanitarian aid, and human 
rights. This approach requires a high level of coordination and support between the 
international coalition members, as well as a singular strategy. 
This new coalition approach is a departure from traditional military thinking 
concerning coalition operations. Traditionally, coalitions involved militaries who would 
deploy to a country and fall under a formal military coalition chain of command, as was 
seen with the International Coalition in Operation Desert Storm, the Multi-National 
Force–Iraq (MNF-I), the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 
or traditional UN-led Peacekeeping Operations (“Blue Hat” missions, as they were 
sometimes called). Figure 1 illustrates how coalitions are traditionally seen: formal, 
hierarchical, and military-led. After receiving political guidance, these military coalitions 
were then given a great deal of authority to plan and execute strategy with the host 
nation. This is the coalition structure into which the military is used to integrating; 
however, this is not the coalition structure that is being employed in Africa today. 
The differences are several: first, militaries are remaining under their national 
commands. Second, Western militaries are usually not deploying to officially declared 
theaters of war, or even deploying in a combat role. Third, military and civilian 
operations are occurring simultaneously, not sequentially, meaning that the military is not 
executing its own operation and then transitioning the area to a civilian-led operation. 
Rather, military and civilian-led operations are occurring at the same time, and 
sometimes in the same locations. As a result, the civilian-led departments, ministries, and 
agencies are playing much larger and more important roles in the coalitions. As shown in 
Figure 2, these new coalitions are more complex, less formalized, and not military-led. 
The militaries are no longer under a single coalition command. Moreover, the militaries 
are not given broad authority to develop and execute coalition strategy, as they had in the 
past, with the host nation or other coalition members. Rather, coalition strategy is being 
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developed through diplomatic lines, and militaries are later given operational 
requirements to fulfill. 
 
Figure 1.  Traditional military coalition construct 
 
Figure 2.  Prevalent military coalition construct in contemporary Africa 
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If the political and operational environment has changed, and the coalition 
structure has changed, then it is reasonable to believe that the military’s approach to 
integration and coordination must also change. 
B. OVERVIEW 
This thesis focuses on a better understanding of the coalition efforts in Africa, and 
then analyzes how militaries can be better integrated into these coalitions. Specifically, 
this thesis studies coalitions that are making a concerted, holistic effort to assist a host 
nation in defeating and dismantling an insurgent movement, and ultimately stabilizing its 
country. This thesis is not focusing on international responses to crises (e.g., 
evacuations), nor is it focusing on specific military operations (i.e., drone strikes, hostage 
rescues), but rather efforts geared towards long-term national stability.   
To examine these issues, this thesis focuses on three case studies of coalitions in 
Africa: Mali, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The rebellion in 
Mali was initially a crisis in which France responded to prevent the collapse of the 
government. Following France’s initial response, an international coalition emerged to 
assist Mali in defeating the Tuareg rebellion and rebuilding the failed government in 
order to re-stabilize the country. In Somalia, an international coalition recently formed to 
assist Somalia in reclaiming its land from Al-Shabaab and building a stable, self-
sufficient country. Similarly, the DRC’s long history of governmental instability and 
insurgent groups prompted the creation of an international coalition effort. However, 
unlike Mali and Somalia, this coalition effort has had little success, largely due to its 
inability to effectively utilize coordination mechanisms between coalition members.4 
From this research, a common trend emerged regarding how these coalitions 
formed structurally, and why they did so. First and foremost, national interests are the 
dominant force driving coalition stakeholders. Between stakeholders, these interests can 
be mutually supporting, competing, or opposing. Moreover, stakeholders only remain in 
the coalition as long as their national interests are being furthered. Additionally, the host 
                                                 
4 Mark Edwards, “United Nations in the Congo: Success or Failure?” (University of California, Santa 
Cruz, April 3, 2009), http://history.ucsc.edu/undergraduate/undergraduate-research/electronic-
journal/journal-pdfs/Edwards2009.pdf. 
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nation, the nation that is receiving coalition assistance, is the only true permanent 
stakeholder, as all other stakeholders retain the ability to exit at will. This is the 
international environment in which these coalitions exist, and there are no signs that this 
environment will be changing. 
To be successful in such an environment, coalitions in Africa have adopted a 
semi-formal structure that allows multi-lateral coordination, but bi-lateral execution. The 
semi-formal structure attracts more stakeholders than a formalized structure could. The 
coalition benefits from collaboration and the combined effects of all of the stakeholders, 
while stakeholders are able to maintain their autonomy to pursue their interests. 
In this type of coalition, the Country Team becomes both the critical external and 
internal coordination node. Externally, the Country Team level is where the coalition’s 
strategy and operational levels meet. Key professionals and experts within each Country 
Team are able to interact frequently and easily with their international counterparts. The 
coalition strategy is developed at this level, as are the multitude of supporting assistance 
programs. Internally, a stakeholder’s entire inter-agency community is represented in the 
Country Team. Experts from all departments of the government are able to interact on a 
daily basis. From this interaction, a stakeholder is able to develop a holistic national 
strategy in which all of the resulting assistance programs can be mutually supporting. 
If the Country Team is the critical coordination node, the question of how 
militaries can better integrate into these coalitions becomes clearer. This thesis strives to 
illustrate why the Country Team is the critical coordination node in this complex 
international environment and resulting flexible, semi-formal coalition construct. We 
conclude by arguing that integrating military planning efforts directly into the Country 





C. THESIS QUESTION 
How can militaries integrate more effectively into today’s coalitions in Africa? 
D. KEY TERMS 
To better understand some of the organizational elements and interactions that are 
discussed in this study, the following terms need be defined. 
1. International Coalition – A group of states or International 
Governmental Organizations (IGO) providing assistance to a host nation. 
The coalition, for this thesis’ purpose, does not necessarily need to be a 
formalized and codified organization. Rather, a coalition represents the 
group of states and IGOs consciously working together, whether it is 
formalized, semi-formal, or purely informal. 
2. Stakeholders – The states and IGOs that are actually contributing to the 
coalition effort. While IGOs (like the United Nations and European 
Union) can be comprised of multiple stakeholders, when the IGO launches 
an assistance effort, that effort falls under a single flag. For example, 
following internal discussions and debates among its members, the EU 
agreed to send a EU Delegation with an accompanying EU Training 
Mission (EUTM) to Mali. The EUTM reported to the EU Delegation, 
which reported to the EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS). In 
this context, IGOs are treated as a single stakeholder in a coalition effort. 
3. Formality – Degree of explicit rules, procedures, and hierarchical control 
that exists within a coalition. 
4. Semi-Formal Coalition – A coalition that has little hierarchical control 
over the various stakeholders. Instead, the majority of the coordination and 
collaboration is done through lateral, horizontal communication lines 
between stakeholders at various levels. 
E. METHOD 
This thesis uses a combination of case studies, interviews, and organizational 
design analyses. The case study analysis examines the coalition efforts in Mali, Somalia, 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, focusing specifically on the coalitions’ 
stakeholders, structure, strategy, and coordination processes. All three case studies depict 
coalitions that are undertaking holistic approaches to assist the host nation in defeating an 
insurgent group and stabilize the nation. In each case study, the stakeholders are 
providing a wide array of assistance. That is, the military assistance is part of a larger 
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multi-sector assistance effort. The Mali case study only has a few major coalition 
stakeholders working together to provide this holistic effort. The Somalia case study also 
illustrates a coalition effort undertaking a holistic assistance approach, but with far more 
stakeholders than in the Mali case study. The DRC case study shows similar problems, 
conditions, and coalition structure as the first two case studies; however, unlike the first 
two case studies, the DRC stakeholders are failing to collaborate effectively.   To 
complement and reinforce this analysis, interviews with the United States Africa 
Command (USAFRICOM) and the Operations Command of the German Federal Armed 
Forces provide additional historical, political, and military information concerning 
ongoing and future coalition and military efforts. 
The key findings of each of these case studies are summarized within each 
respective case. Chapters II, III, and IV analyze the coalition efforts in Mali, Somalia, 
and the DRC, respectively. From this analysis, Chapter V identifies the common trends in 
these coalition efforts, examines how these trends are likely to persist beyond the bounds 
of these specific cases, and presents recommendations for how the military can adapt and 
better integrate itself into future coalition efforts in Africa. 
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II. MALI CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Mali is home to the largest population of Tuareg people, holding nearly 621,100 
of the 2,000,000 total Tuaregs living across the Saharan countries.5  Throughout the 
Saharan states, the Tuaregs are poorly represented in just about every national 
government, especially in Mali. Living mostly in the poverty stricken areas to the north, 
they are often victims of income inequality, government prejudice, and racism.6  As a 
result, the Tuaregs have fought against the past governments that condone or promote 
these injustices.7  This toxic relationship has led to five separate Tuareg uprisings in 
Mali: 1890, 1910, 1962, 1990, and 2006.8  Unfortunately, these rebellions and toxic 
relationship have had devastating consequences for the Tuaregs, affecting their 
communities, class structures, and local economies.9 
Constant marginalization has prompted Tuareg tribes to put aside their tribal 
rivalries and band together in a common cause.10  Out of necessity and desperation, 
Tuaregs have also banded together with Islamic radical groups with similar political 
grievances.11  Islamic radical groups, such as the National Movement for the Liberations 
of Azawad (MNLA), the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), 
                                                 
5 Karin Dillon, Prospects for Peace in Northern Mali: The Touareg Rebellion’s Causes, 
Consequences, and Peacebuilding Process (ProQuest, 2007), 8. 
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 Freedom C. Onuoha and Alex Thurston, “Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and 
Evolving Security Concerns,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies. 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/2/19/2013219 
84326956734FrancoAfrican_Intervention_Mali.pdf (accessed May, 2013), 2013, 3. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Dillon, Prospects for Peace in Northern Mali: The Touareg Rebellion’s Causes, Consequences, and 
Peacebuilding Process, 24. 
10 X. Renou, “A New French Policy for Africa?,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20, no. 1 
(January 2002): 5–27. 
11 Vanda Felbab-Brown and James J. F. Forest, “Political Violence and the Illicit Economies of West 
Africa,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 5 (November 2012): 790. 
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and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are all supporting the current conflict.12  
Tuaregs do not necessarily share the same overall religious aspirations as these extremist 
groups, but this partnership is seen as a necessary evil if the Tuaregs ever want to achieve 
their goals.13 
In 2012, Tuareg rebels, partnered with various Islamic extremist groups, 
threatened to take over the entire country.14  Though proving to be an extremely difficult 
fight, Mali, France, the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) and the European 
Union (EU) have formed a semi-formal coalition to counter the rebellion. This coalition 
began with a military focus, but has since grown into a holistic assistance and reform 
effort. France and the AU’s Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
were initially focused on stopping the rebellion militarily, thus preventing a government 
collapse. However, when the military offensive operation soon changed to a stability 
operation, the UN and EU joined the coalition.15  Today, the coalition’s mission and 
strategy include a holistic effort to improve the country’s stability and address the root 
causes to the Tuareg rebellion.1617  This study examines the formation and evolution of 
this coalition, as well as the unique relationships between the coalition stakeholders. 
B. THE REBELLION AND INITIAL COALITION RESPONSE 
In January 2012, Tuareg separatists in the north, under the flag of the National 
Movement for the liberation of Azawad (MNLA), declared a rebellion against the 
                                                 
12 Onuoha and Thurston, “Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving 
Security Concerns.” 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 2. 
15 Magdalena Tham Lindell and Kim Mattsson, “Transnational Threats to Peace and Security in the 
Sahel,” Sweden: Swedish Defense Research Agency, June, 2014, 29. 
16 Thierry Tardy, “Mali: The UN Takes Over,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_Mali.pdf, 2013, 1. 
17 Juan Carlos Castilla Barea, “The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of the EUTM,” 




government of Mali.18  The Malian military, however, was too poorly trained and ill 
equipped to handle the intense fighting; and Tuareg rebels quickly took control of nearly 
two thirds of the country.19  The military grew angry of President Touré’s leadership, and 
blamed Touré’s administration for the military’s losses and lack of appropriate equipment 
and training. Discontent led to protests and a military coup ultimately removed Touré 
from office, in March.20 
After Touré’s removal, an interim government took over and began trying to 
reestablish governance and stability with the assistance of the AU. But as the rebellion 
pushed closer to the capital city of Bamako, Mali’s interim government was forced to 
reach out for more immediate support. Mali first looked to ECOWAS for support, in 
September 2012.21  ECOWAS responded to Mali’s request with a two-pronged approach. 
First, ECOWAS attempted to mediate a peace agreement between the government, 
MNLA, and the other factions. This negotiation process would continue for several 
months. ECOWAS also pursued a military response, in case the negotiations failed.22  
UN Resolution 2071 was a major step in this process as it allowed ECOWAS to develop 
military response options with Mali and other interested international members.23   
As the negotiation process stretched out, the likelihood of a negotiated settlement 
decreased. The situation became more difficult when the MNLA lost control of the 
smaller factions and terrorist groups.24  These terrorist groups not only rejected the 
                                                 
18 Onuoha and Thurston, “Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving 
Security Concerns,” 3. 
19 Anouar Boukhars and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Simmering Discontent in the 
Western Sahara (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 4, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/western_sahara.pdf; Note: Connect to online 
resourcehttp://carnegieendowment.org/files/western_sahara.pdf. 
20 Cristina Barrios and Tobias Koepf, “Building Peace in Mali: The Elections and beyond,” European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, no. 28 (July 2013), 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_28.pdf. 
21 Onuoha and Thurston, “Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving 
Security Concerns,” 2. 
22 Ibid., 4. 
23 UN Security Council, “UNSC Resolution 2071” (United Nations Security Council, October 12, 
2012), http://unowa.unmissions.org/Portals/UNOWA/Security%20council/Resolution%202071.pdf. 
24 Onuoha and Thurston, “Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving 
Security Concerns,” 2. 
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negotiations, they also took control of several cities from the Tuaregs.25  With 
ECOWAS’ diplomatic approach failing, ECOWAS turned to its military option. 
In December 2012, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed 
Resolution 2085, authorizing the deployment of military combat forces to Mali.26  The 
resolution authorized the creation and deployment of an AU military force, called the 
African-Led Mission in Support of Mali (AFISMA) to assist and strengthen the Malian 
security forces.27  Though authorized in December, it was unclear how fast AFISMA 
could actually deploy its forces. In the meantime, the terrorist groups continued their 
offensive, capturing additional towns and territory.28 
In response to the increasing threat and the slow AFISMA deployment, France, 
with Mali’s approval, deployed its own military force, Operation SERVAL, in January 
2013. The French forces led the counter-offensive alongside the Malian military. 
AFISMA, though struggling logistically, was able to slowly deploy its forces in a 
piecemeal fashion.29  Because AFISMA and SERVAL deployed nearly at the same time, 
there was little opportunity for the two entities to coordinate combined operations or 
outline a unified strategy.30  Both SERVAL and AFISMA operated through their own bi-
lateral agreements with Malian Government.31  There were no documents or agreements 
that outlined a formal coalition command relationship. Coordination and de-confliction 
between AFISMA, SERVAL, and the Malian military was accomplished through direct 
and ad-hoc leadership meetings. Through these meetings, it was determined that the 
                                                 
25 Helga Dickow, “Mali,” Bundeszentrale Für Politische Bildung, January 6, 2014, 
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26 UN Security Council, “UNSC Resolution 2071,” 1–5. 
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French SERVAL mission would lead offensive military operations against the rebellion, 
while AFISMA would hold and secure the ground that the French forces recaptured. 
These two military efforts should be seen as complementary operations, though they were 
executed separately. Figure 3 illustrates the ad-hoc relationship between these two 
stakeholders. France, ECOWAS, and their respective military efforts coordinated and 
synchronized mostly through lateral communication channels.32 
 
Figure 3.  Initial coalition construct in Mali 
Within a few months of operation, the coalition was able to stop the rebel advance 
and begin taking ground back from the rebels. While both SERVAL and AFISMA were 
having success, there is no evidence to suggest that either SERVAL or AFISMA had a 
long-term plan, in the event that they were required to stay beyond their initial mandate. 
As a result, there was no unified strategy, nor did either stakeholder plan address the 
post-conflict and reform period.33   
                                                 
32 Christophe Berthier, Interview with French Officers at the desk of the French LNO to 
USAFRICOM, July 16, 2014. 
33 Onuoha and Thurston, “Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving 
Security Concerns,” 4. 
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C. MATURING COALITION  
As AFISMA and SERVAL pushed the rebels back, ECOWAS and Mali 
continued to engage the UN for assistance. The military offensive phase was coming to a 
close and the focus was now shifting to stability operations. As a result, the coalition 
stakeholders had to refocus their efforts and develop a new post-conflict strategy. A long-
term stability strategy for Mali would be needed in order to capitalize on the military 
successes and provide lasting effects. The UN was extremely interested in Mali’s long-
term stability, so the UN created the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (MINUSMA) in April 2013.34  MINUSMA would assume the AFISMA’s 
responsibilities and would also expand international assistance into governance, 
economic, humanitarian aid, and human rights sectors.35  The AFISMA forces would 
now work under MINUSMA; they began conducting community patrols, promoting 
legitimate and transparent governance, and securing voting and polling stations for the 
upcoming election.36  
Ever since France’s SERVAL mission, the European Union was also planning to 
offer assistance.37  However, the EU was not inclined to become involved in a combat 
mission. Instead, the EU was pursuing a security assistance role that was in line with the 
EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The European Union Training 
Mission (EUTM) was created in February 2013, but wasn’t deployed to Mali until April 
2013.38    Through a bi-lateral agreement with Mali, the EUTM would work directly with 
the Malian military to train four new battalions.,3940 The EU fell into the existing semi-
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http://www.foi.se/Documents/European%20Union%20Training%20Mission%20Mali-
%20Challenges%20and%20Opportunities.pdf. 
39 Barea, “The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of the EUTM.” 
40 Wiklund and Skeppstrom, “European Union Training Mission Mali – Challenges and 
Opportunities.” 
 15
formal coalition construct, coordinating efforts multi-laterally with France and 
MINUSMA. The EU Delegation to Mali would oversee the EU’s overall efforts in Mali, 
and would coordinate with Mali and the other stakeholders’ embassies. A EU Special 
Representative for the Sahel was also created to help implement, coordinate, and develop 
the EU’s comprehensive strategy in the Sahel. This Special Representative and his staff 
would work closely with the EU Delegation to Mali.41 
For the coalition to be effective in providing long-term assistance, it needed some 
kind of unifying strategy. The coalition also recognized two facts: (1) stakeholder support 
would vary over the long-term, and (2) Mali needed to accept the strategy and be held 
accountable. As a result, Mali, with help from the stakeholders, developed a Plan Pour la 
Relance Durable (PRED), or Plan for Sustainable Recovery.42  This plan outlined Mali’s 
assistance needs across all sectors, to include security, humanitarian assistance, 
democratic and transparent governance, judicial system reform, infrastructure 
development, basic government services, public finance, economic growth, education, 
health services, and women’s rights. Moreover, Mali created a national-level Monitoring 
Committee, with four sub-commissions, to maintain accountability and provide periodic 
status reports.43 
Mali then presented this 4.3-million euro plan to the international community at 
the High-Level Conference on Support and Development of Mali. France, the EU, and 
UN organized this conference, as a means to highlight the coalition’s shift to long-term 
stability assistance, show their commitment to Mali’s Plan, and garner additional donor 
support. The Presidents of Mali, France, and the European Commission co-chaired the 
conference to underscore the importance of the plan and coalition’s commitment. In the 
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end, 108 countries attended the conference and pledged a total of 3.25-billion euros to 
support Mali’s Recovery Plan.44 
The coalition now had new stakeholders, a unifying strategy, and funding. 
Overall, the coalition construct would remain the same, with the stakeholders 
coordinating multi-laterally, and executing assistance programs bi-laterally with Mali. 
Direct coordination would still be important at the operational levels. For example, 
SERVAL and MINUSMA had detailed knowledge of Mali’s current military training and 
equipment shortfalls, so EUTM was able to draw from this knowledge, as it developed 
and refined its military assistance program. 
However, most of the multi-lateral coordination would now occur between the 
Country Teams and Delegations, as the majority of the assistance efforts were non-
military. For example, MINUSMA, under the leadership of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General, was responsible for all of the UN-related assistance. Besides the 
UN security assistance effort already on the ground, the UN was now also managing new 
assistance programs that covered human rights, rule of law, health and nutrition, water 
and sanitation, demining, agriculture, emergency food and shelter, and education.45  
Figure 4 illustrates the current coalition construct, with the majority of the coordination 
occurring between the stakeholders’ Country Team and Delegations. 
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Figure 4.  Current coalition construct in Mali 
D. ANALYSIS 
1. Stakeholders and National Interests 
This case study highlights how changing stakeholder interests drive a coalition’s 
focus. The initial Tuareg rebellion only immediately affected a few stakeholders. 
Neighboring countries, like Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, and Mauritania, realized that 
the rebellion threatened not only regional stability, but also their respective national 
economies.46  As members of ECOWAS, these countries pressured the AU to take 
immediate action in assisting the Malian military. The AU was interested in assisting 
Mali, not only because Mali is an AU member state, but also because the AU wanted to 
prove that it is an effective organization. Past AU assistance efforts to build a lasting 
peace between the Mali government and Tuaregs had failed.47  Moreover, the AU 
believed that greater African participation could offset the negative perceptions of French 
intervention in a former colony. 
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47 Ibid. 
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Similarly, France’s interests were immediately threatened by the rebellion. Nearly 
12% of Mali’s imported goods come from France.48  Moreover, much of Mali’s imports 
from Senegal are actually products from France.49  France was also worried about the 
stability of its uranium supply from Nigeria, as the mines were located near Mali’s 
border.50  Finally, France still had nearly 40,000 French citizens living in Mali, whose 
safety posed an immediate political issue in France. As a result of these interests, France 
and the ECOWAS nations were the first to respond to Mali’s crisis. Both stakeholders 
were focused solely on stopping the rebellion, which would remove the immediate threat 
to the stakeholder interests. 
These two stakeholders were willing to coordinate their efforts, as their interests 
were mutually supporting. France, as the larger and more capable stakeholder, took the 
lead in the counter-offensive against the Tuareg rebellion. AFISMA supported the 
offensive by providing security behind France’s forces, ensuring there was no power 
vacuum or loss of governance. The military successes of France’s SERVAL mission and 
ECOWAS’ AFISMA mission effectively protected France’s civilians and ensured that 
Mali’s government and economy would not collapse. The coalition focus could now shift 
to long-term stability and assistance. With this shift, additional stakeholders were now 
willing to join the coalition. The UN had significant interests in regional stability, 
transparent governance, and human rights.51  When the coalition switched its focus to 
stability and long-term assistance, the UN was willing to create the MINUSMA mission. 
Similarly, the coalition’s new stability focus was in line with the EU’s CSDP as well as 
the EU member state’s broader interests, reflected in the 1975 Lome Agreement.52  As a 
result, the EU was able to gain enough member support to deploy a EU Training Mission, 
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create a Special Representative for the Sahel, and implement a comprehensive approach 
to the crisis in Mali. With a new focus and new stakeholders with mutually supporting 
interests, the coalition could continue to coordinate multi-laterally. 
2. Semi-Formal Coalition Structure 
This coalition benefited from the fact that the stakeholders shared many mutual 
goals, and there were no major conflicting interests. The initial coalition between France 
and ECOWAS-AFISMA adopted a semi-formal structure, because there was a critical 
need to respond quickly. There was no time for the stakeholders to enter into a formal 
coalition agreement. Discussions on national caveats, coalition command, and coalition 
mission scope would have delayed the military response. Instead, coordination and 
collaboration occurred in an ad-hoc and informal manner between military units at the 
operational level, and between national leadership at the strategic level. After 
coordinating, the stakeholders then bi-laterally executed their plans with Mali. 
When the coalition moved into its current stability phase, the need for quick 
response was replaced with the desire to maintain autonomy and flexibility. By 
maintaining a semi-formal construct, the coalition could remain flexible to changing 
stakeholder support. The coalition would continue to coordinate and synchronize efforts, 
ensuring a more unified effort. At the same time, by having the stakeholders execute bi-
laterally with Mali, the stakeholders maintained the autonomy to further their national 
interests, and Mali remained empowered and accountable for its own recovery. Because 
there were only four major stakeholders in the coalition, there was no need for the 
creation of additional coordinating mechanisms or a coalition command. Mali was given 
the responsibility of “managing” the overall strategy, while France, the EU, the UN, and 
the AU coordinated the coalition effort. With the overall coalition assistance effort 
growing more complex and diverse, the stakeholder Country Team and Delegations 
assumed more of the coordination responsibilities. 
 
 20
3. The Key Coordination Node 
The initial France-ECOWAS coalition relied on direct coordination between 
military units. This made sense because the coalition only had a few military objectives. 
However, when the coalition’s focus shifted to stability and long-term assistance, there 
was a need to shift the primary coordination role to the Country Team/Delegation. The 
coalition would now provide assistance to Mali’s security, governance, economic, and 
humanitarian sectors. The Country Team/Delegation, with its multi-agency representation 
and location in Bamako, were best suited to take on this complex coordination task. 
The Country Teams/Delegations, particularly the French Embassy and EU 
Delegation, played an important role in assisting Mali with the development of its Plan 
for Sustainable Recovery (PRED). Not only did the Country Teams have to ensure that 
the plan adequately addressed Mali’s needs, but that it also addressed the stakeholders’ 
interests and expectations. The stakeholder input into the PRED is evident by the 
emphasis on women’s rights, environmentalism, and monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms. These are stakeholder interests that Mali likely had to address in order to 
receive assistance in its security and economic sectors.   
With the coalition now providing broad assistance, the Country Teams are 
responsible for overseeing the assistance efforts and ensuring that Mali fulfills its 
accountability and transparency obligations, as outlined in the PRED. The Country 
Teams are also responsible for ensuring that there is no duplication of effort between the 
stakeholders. The EU and UN seem to have closest working relationship in this regard, as 
both are providing the widest range of assistance efforts. The EU is currently providing 
assistance in the security sector via EUTM and EUCAP, and to the transportation, 
agriculture, water & energy, economic, and migration sectors through the EU 
Delegation.,5354 Meanwhile, MINUSMA is managing assistance programs being 
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executed by a variety of UN organizations, including UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, UN 
Women, WHO, WFP, IOM, and UNDP.55  Finally, there are other minor stakeholders, 
like the United States, who are providing some assistance to Mali, both directly and 
indirectly, through either the EU or MINUSMA.56  It’s clear that the coalition is 
providing a substantial holistic effort to Mali, under a unified strategy. That said, from 
the long-term perspective, this coalition effort is still in its infancy. While many of the 
assistance efforts are having immediate positive effects, it is still too early to assess the 
long-term effectiveness of the coalition effort. 
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III. SOMALIA CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Somalia’s recent instability and insurgency problems began with escalating clan 
clashes that ultimately resulted in civil war and the 1991 government collapse.57 From 
1991–1995, the international community made a concerted effort to stem the violence, 
stabilize the country, and bring humanitarian assistance to the Somali people. However, 
in 1995, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) withdrew its forces from 
Somalia, effectively ending the international ground efforts.58 Diplomatic efforts 
continued for the next twelve years. However, it wasn’t until 2006 that the international 
community would once again come together to assist the Somali government in restoring 
security and stability to the country. Today, there are well over a dozen countries and 
international organizations working together to assist Somalia across a broad array of 
sectors: security, justice, governance, economy, Humanitarian Assistance (HA), 
Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR), and Counter-Piracy (CP). 
A great deal has happened in Somalia, since the 1991 collapse: the formation of 
the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), the rise of Al-Shabaab, the creation of a transitional 
government, the reestablishment of a government in Somalia, national elections, and the 
ratification of a constitution, just to name a few. Against the backdrop of these events, 
this case study focuses on the recent international coalition effort, which grew out of the 
diplomatic efforts by the United Nations (UN) and growing interests of several 
stakeholders. This study uses the U.S. and EU in several diagrams and examples to 
illustrate various points; however, these points can be applied to any of the stakeholders 
involved in Somalia. 
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B. EARLY INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION 
Following UNOSOM II, the UN created the United Nations Political Office for 
Somalia (UNPOS) on April 15, 1995 “to pursue peace and reconciliation through 
contacts with Somali leaders, civic organizations, and the states and organizations 
concerned.”59 From 1995–2006, UNPOS, with the assistance of the African Union (AU) 
and many East African countries, worked to create a new Somali Transitional Federal 
Government and build international support for Somalia. UNPOS did this through bi-
lateral, multi-lateral, and UN Security Council meetings.60 While these meetings were 
successful in discussing the political, military, and security situations in Somalia, they 
failed to form a coordinated international effort that could be projected into Somalia. 
Despite the lack of international commitment, there was no lack of interested 
stakeholders. The AU and UN, as major international organizations, want to build a 
strong, functional government that could stabilize the country. Ethiopian and Kenyan 
interests are not necessarily focused on reestablishing a strong Somalia government, but 
rather protecting their borders and citizens from the increasing threat of the UIC and Al-
Shabaab.61 Somalia’s instability also threatens a joint Kenya-Uganda-South Sudan oil 
pipeline venture with a port terminus in Lamu, near the Somalia border.62 In addition to 
economic interests, Uganda has security and political interests in Somalia. First, 
demonstrating its military capabilities in Somalia could serve as a deterrent to potential 
insurgent actors in and around Uganda. Uganda could also use the AMISOM mission to 
increase its CT and military relationships with the U.S., while also increasing its 
influence regionally, as well as within the AU and the UNSC.63 
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Other stakeholders like the EU and U.S. have interests in Somalia that are more 
closely linked to terrorism, international shipping, and economic markets.64 The U.S. is 
particularly interested in denying Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab a sanctuary from which they 
could project terrorism abroad.65 Increased stability would also improve foreign 
investment in not only East African markets, but would also open up foreign investment 
in Somali markets, particularly oil, fisheries, and shipping.66 Despite all of these interests, 
there wasn’t sufficient political will for the stakeholders to commit ground forces 
between 1994 and 2006. 
Due to the increasing UIC and Al-Shabaab threat, Ethiopia was ultimately the 
first country to offer direct military support to the new Somali government.67 In a bi-
lateral agreement with Somalia in 2006, Ethiopia committed forces to retake Baidoa and 
then Mogadishu. By December 28, 2006, the UIC and Al-Shabaab had been pushed out 
of Baidoa and Mogadishu, and the Somali transitional government had reestablished 
itself in the capital.68 
Ethiopia’s successful military operation served as a catalyst for more tangible 
international support, and the UN was now able to muster additional contributor 
countries. The AU immediately announced its desire to assist Somalia, with Uganda and 
Burundi pledging military troops.69 The UN Security Council (UNSC) then passed 
UNSC Resolution #1744, authorizing the AU to organize an 8,000-man peacekeeping 
mission—the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).70 
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Though the AU members were providing ground forces, the AU lacked the means 
to logistically support and finance the AMISOM mission. This was solved, at least 
temporarily, through a series of bi-lateral agreements with other international 
contributors. The European Union (EU) primarily, along with a few other contributing 
countries, agreed to finance the AMISOM mission. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) agreed to provide strategic airlift assets. Separate from the NATO 
agreement, the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (UK), and France also agreed to 
fund and support various logistical and sustainment requirements. Additionally, the UN 
was able to reallocate equipment from the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) to 
the AMISOM forces.71 All of this was accomplished through an ad-hoc collaboration 
process between the stakeholders, using a series of multi-lateral and bi-lateral 
meetings.,7273 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF A COALITION 
With a coalition effort finally on the ground, the next challenge was to develop a 
unified strategy and a long-term plan for international support. Initially, the international 
community continued to use the same ad-hoc processes. Countries and organizations 
spoke bi-laterally, and occasionally came together in a multi-lateral forum. In June 2008, 
the UN made the first big step in bringing the international stakeholders together in a 
meaningful collaborative process. As part of the Djibouti Agreement, UNPOS and the 
Somali government established a Joint Security Committee (JSC) and a High Level 
Committee (HLC).74 The JSC was created to “ensure the effective implementation of 
security arrangements as per the Djibouti Agreement,” and was co-chaired by UNPOS 
and the AU.75 While the JSC focused on the security sector, the HLC focused on “issues 
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relating to the political cooperation between the Parties, Justice, and Reconciliation,” and 
was chaired by the UN.76 Moreover, the JSC and HLC would meet at least monthly (a 
relatively high frequency in the international political world) to keep pace with new 
developments and progress. The JSC and HLC would help identify specific focus areas 
and help coordinate the international effort. However, the actual execution would still be 
done bi-laterally. In this way, the JSC and HLC provided formal forums for informal 
collaboration. Figure 5 depicts how the High Level Committee and the Joint Security 
Committee facilitated the collaboration not only between stakeholders, but also with the 
Somalia government. Outside these committees, the stakeholders still continued to meet, 
with the Country Teams and Sector Representatives speaking several times a month or 
even weekly, and the Foreign Affairs Components speaking once every 1–3 months. 
 
Figure 5.  Initial coalition construct in Somalia, Creation of the HLC and JSC 
                                                 
76 United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), “High Level Committee Terms of Reference, 




With this semi-formal coordination structure installed, the UN now had to 
readdress the logistical and financial support to AMISOM. AMISOM’s mission scope, 
task force size, and area of operations were all expanding, straining its current logistical 
structure. The UN agreed to take on this logistical expansion, and created UN Support 
Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). To help fund UNSOA’s mission, the UNSC created a 
“Trust Fund,” where any willing country or organization could contribute.77 The UN also 
held an International Donors Conference in Brussels, under the joint auspices of the UN, 
EU, AU, and League of Arab States. The conference exceeded the UN’s expectations, by 
raising an additional $213-million for support to AMISOM and Somalia.78 From 2009–
2012 alone, stakeholder donations into this Trust Fund provided $729-million for 
UNSOA support to AMISOM.79 
D. MATURING COALITION 
If the overall support efforts were to have any long-term success, Somalia had to 
take a greater role and responsibility in the collaboration processes. This transformation 
began in August 2010, with the transformation of the JSC. In the new JSC Terms of 
Reference (TOR), the Somali government would now be a co-chair, alongside UNPOS 
and the AU.80 The JSC would be responsible for coordinating the International 
Community’s (IC) support to Somalia, ensuring transparency and accountability, and 
providing strategic guidance to the JSC’s newly created Technical Working Groups.81 
Under the JSC, five Technical Working Groups would help to coordinate 
international support within specific sectors. A Somali Ministry-level representative and 
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a UNPOS representative would chair each of the working groups.82 The five groups were 
the Military Technical Working Group (MTWG), the Police Technical Working Group 
(PTWG), the Security and Justice Sectors Technical Working Group (SJSTWG), the 
Strategic Planning and Programming Technical Working Group (SPPTWG), and the 
Counter Piracy Task Force (CPTF).83 Figure 6 shows how the technical working groups 
provided a more formalized coordination mechanism for sector specific efforts. EU and 
U.S. military advisors, used as examples in Figure 6, would meet with Somali MoD 
representatives at the Military Technical Working Group. 
 
Figure 6.  Coalition construct in Somalia, HLC and JSC with Working Groups. 
Though the JSC’s formal structure was increasing, stakeholders still had a great 
deal of flexibility. Contributing countries and organizations only attended the working 
groups that corresponded to the type of assistance that they were willing to give. For 




example, the MTWG sought to coordinate specific support, funding, and training to the 
Somali National Army. Any stakeholder willing to provide support (whether it be money, 
equipment, troops, or a combination of those) to the Somali Military would attend the 
MTWG. As stakeholders offered up support, the MTWG would recommend ways for that 
support to be incorporated into the overall ongoing effort. However, neither the JSC nor 
the Working Groups could force a stakeholder into providing a specific type of support. 
Additionally, support programs were still ultimately executed bi-laterally, and 
stakeholders were not technically required to attend the MTWG meetings. A stakeholder 
could bypass the JSC-Working Group structure and coordinate bi-laterally, with or 
without the JSC’s knowledge. 
With the Somali government now taking increased ownership of the coordination 
process, a single strategy was needed. With the assistance of UNPOS and other major 
stakeholders, Somalia developed a National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP), 
which was released in October 2011.84 The NSSP outlined Somalia’s current situation, 
threats, key challenges, strategic objectives, and accountability implementing measures. 
The NSSP also addressed human rights, gender, and religious rights, protection of 
children and minorities, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), and refugees.85 Finally, the 
NSSP outlined a general Implementation Action Plan, which assigned key issues, 
priorities, and benchmarks to specific Somalia Ministries.86 The Ministries would then 
bring those priorities to the Working Groups. 
Between 2011 and 2014, international support continued to increase. The 
AMISOM mission grew, with Kenya and Djibouti joining in 2011, Sierra Leone in 2012, 
and Ethiopia in 2014.87 UNSOA’s logistical support also increased during this period. In 
a November 2013 Resolution, the UNSC authorized UNSOA to also provide support to 
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Somalia National Army (SNA) forces operating alongside AMISOM forces.88 The 
international community’s official recognition of the Federal Republic of Somalia and 
lifting of the arms embargo opened the door for even more international support to 
Somalia.89 
The JSC-Working Group structure also continued to evolve. The Working Groups 
developed their own sub-committees—some permanent, others temporary—each 
focusing on more specific issue areas. For example, the MTWG’s Training Sub-
committee coordinated critical training requirements. AMISOM forces took on much of 
the infantry training tasks, while EUTM provided specialty training tasks, including 
Combat Lifesaver, battalion staff training, communications, and mine clearance.90 The 
working groups continued to meet formally monthly. However, with increased security in 
Mogadishu, many of the stakeholders were moving offices into Mogadishu. This allowed 
the stakeholders’ representatives to meet informally several times a month.91 
The 2013 Somalia Compact outlined the latest evolution of the international 
coordination mechanisms. Drafted by Somalia, the UN, and the EU, the Somalia 
Compact sought to further formalize the Somalia strategy and the coordination 
mechanisms for international aid to Somalia, in an effort to improve its effectiveness and 
accountability.92 The Compact addressed five Peace and State-building Goals (PSG): 
Inclusive Politics, Security, Justice, Economic Foundations, and Revenue and Services.93 
The Compact also identified new forums for international coordination, as well as 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms for the implementation of programs.94 A High 
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Level Partnership Forum (HLPF) replaced the HLC. Meeting quarterly, it would attempt 
to align the Somalia’s PSG priorities with those of the international contributors. Below 
the HLPF, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) was created to 
“achieve greater alignment of international financing with the Compact priorities, reduce 
the fragmentation of aid, and increase Somali ownership and leadership of the transition 
process.”95 Figure 7 shows this current coalition construct, with the addition of the 
SDRF. Like the HLPF, the SDRF would meet quarterly. The JSC and its Working 
Groups would continue working, as already designed, below the SDRF.   
 
Figure 7.  Current coalition construct in Somalia. 
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E. ANALYSIS 
1. Stakeholders and National Interests 
National interests had the greatest impact in shaping the coalition effort. In 
Somalia’s case, there are a wide variety of interests among the coalition stakeholders. 
The AU, UN, and EU, as major international organizations, were unique in that they 
actually shared most of Somalia’s own interests: security, governance, economy, and 
human rights. Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and several other African countries had national 
interests centered on their own security, economic, and political interests, rather than on 
Somalia’s interests. The non-African stakeholders, mostly western countries, had 
interests in counter-terrorism, international trade, and global markets. 
As coalition partners, there is a natural pairing between African and Western 
countries. The African stakeholders were willing to commit their own security forces and 
take the lead in the coalition ground operations. Today, the AMISOM mission has over 
22,000 soldiers, all of them African.96 Complimenting this African military effort are the 
western countries, which are providing the most of the funding, specialty training, and 
advisors. Equipping, training, deploying, and sustaining AMISOM and the Somalia 
National Army (SNA), represents the largest cost. Between 2007 and 2012, the UN, EU, 
and U.S. were the largest western donors to AMISOM, providing $730-million, $533-
million, and $340-million (respectively) to such training and support programs.97 This 
division of efforts seems to make sense, as security is an essential element of the overall 
strategy, but the western stakeholders are politically unwilling to commit large numbers 
of their own security forces. 
Western stakeholders have taken the lead in improving Somalia’s governance, 
economy, and public infrastructure, as these are cost intensive projects and more aligned 
with their national interests. Combined, the U.S., EU, UK, and UN have provided at least 
$271.5-million in humanitarian aid, public infrastructure projects, business loans, 
development of fisheries, agriculture improvement, small loans, vocational training and 
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school, and livestock ranching.98 The true total value of international assistance to 
Somalia’s economic, governance, and public infrastructure development is likely much 
higher, as data on stakeholder contributions are not widely available, and some 
stakeholders prefer not to disclose such investments. 
2. Semi-Formal Coalition Structure 
The coalition structure had to balance the need for a unified international effort, 
and the stakeholders’ needs to achieve their own interests. Some stakeholders, like the 
U.S., UN, UK, and EU contribute across all of the sectors, as their interests are quite 
broad. Other stakeholders have more limited interests. Italy, Greece, and the Shell 
Corporation, for example, have contributed significantly to some of the UN counter 
piracy efforts, but not to any of the other efforts.99 Ethiopia preferred to operate alone, 
and long fought the international pressure to join AMISOM, the unified African Peace 
Support operation.100 The coalition effort couldn’t afford to lose stakeholders or their 
contributions, so the coalition adapted by developing a semi-formal coordination 
structure. Strategy and assistance programs would be discussed in a multi-lateral 
environment. However, stakeholders would maintain their autonomy, and would 
ultimately execute their assistance programs bi-laterally with Somalia—not as a single 
coalition. 
The initial collaboration and early coalition both relied on semi-formal, horizontal 
communication. The bi-lateral and multi-lateral meetings allowed experts from each 
stakeholder to interact with their international counterparts, and discuss various issues at 
length. Any assistance proposals would ultimately have to be staffed, approved, and 
resourced by each individual stakeholder. Through this method, UNPOS, the AU, EU, 
U.S., UK, and France were able to stand-up and support the AMISOM mission and the 
Ethiopian military operation. 
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Later, this same semi-formal collaboration method was used to start a support 
program for the Somalia National Army (SNA). The EU agreed to fund and man a 
training program, while the U.S. focused on SNA recruitment and military infrastructure 
improvements. Additionally, UNPOS agreed to manage international coordination and 
additional stakeholder recruitment.101 All of these agreements and commitments were 
executed bi-laterally, though these major contributors were operating in collaboration 
with each other. 
The JSC-Working Group structure gave the coalition better horizontal 
coordinating mechanisms, while maintaining flexibility to accommodate fluid 
stakeholder support. Stakeholders were still able to participate, without being forced to 
overcommit or scared away. Many experts believe the effort in Somalia will take at least 
10–15 years.102 Any holistic assistance and reform effort, particularly in Somalia, is a 
long-term commitment. Realistically, few countries would be politically willing to 
publicly commit to a 15-year coalition effort in a foreign country. The semi-formal HLC 
and JSC-Working Group structure essentially gives the coalition effort long-term stability 
and direction, even as stakeholders, and their contributions, are likely to change over the 
years. 
The HLC, JSC, and working groups improved the ability for the stakeholder 
experts and decision makers to collaborate horizontally, without having to be bogged 
down by a new coalition bureaucratic system. Goals and efforts did not have to be staffed 
through coalition systems for implementation. Rather, these goal and efforts were folded 
into each stakeholder’s own strategy and planning documents.,103,104105 It was then each 
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county’s responsibility to develop, fund, and execute the programs that would address 
these common goals. 
The coalition effort seems to be most coordinated in the security, justice, 
accountability, and human rights sectors, as increased security, reduced corruption, 
oversight, and human rights are in the interests of nearly all stakeholders. The Military 
Technical Working Group seems to be the most developed and robust working group, 
with several sub-committees and even a newly formed Military Coordination Center that 
focuses specifically on supporting the operational needs of the AMISOM and SNA 
forces.106 Similarly, the major contributors have made a coordinated push for the Somali 
Government to begin implementing mechanisms to ensure funding accountability and 
human rights protections. However, there seems to be less collaboration in other sectors. 
In the economic development sector, there is a mix of collaboration and competitiveness 
between the stakeholders. The stakeholders recognize the mutual benefits in improving 
governance and finance management, but their collaboration is minimal as they are still 
competing for influence in limited economic markets.107 
Much like the JSC-Working Group structure, the overall strategy is also semi-
formal. Moreover, it is technically Somalia’s strategy. The stakeholders are only 
supporting various aspects of the strategy. The only enforcement mechanism was the 
major stakeholders’ and Somalia’s diplomatic powers. Major stakeholders, like the UN, 
EU, and U.S., could use diplomatic tools to ‘encourage’ other stakeholders to cooperate 
with the international effort and support Somalia’s strategy. However, as previously 
illustrated, these tools had their limits and the stakeholders had to choose which 
diplomatic battles to fight. Somalia could technically refuse aid, if that assistance did not 
support the overall strategy. However, given the realities of Somalia’s weak internal 
political control, lack of control of its borders and land, and great need for any outside 
assistance, it would be incredibly difficult for Somalia to refuse aid or prevent a 
stakeholder from bypassing the central government and engaging regional or local 
authorities within Somalia. 
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Of course, no coalition system is without its challenges. While this semi-formal 
coordination is a strength of this coalition structure, it only works if all stakeholders 
actively use the coordination mechanisms. For instance, Ethiopia had a SNA training 
program in western Somalia that was not coordinated with the larger EU-AMISOM 
training effort.108 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) also prefers to deal with Somalia bi-
laterally, rather than collaborate with the coalition. While much of the UAE’s aid is 
uncontroversial, like its significant humanitarian aid and relief support, the UAE’s 
support of the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) has been very controversial.109 
The UAE-funded PMPF has been effective in keeping the UAE’s key shipping lanes free 
of pirate attacks. However, the PMPF is also a force loyal to Puntland’s President, rather 
than to Somalia’s central government, which could prove problematic to the coalition’s 
political reform efforts and potentially destabilizing to the country. The PMPF’s 
existence and operations continues to be a point of contention.110 
Additionally, because the coalition had no central command authority or 
centralized functional organization (for funding), stakeholders have sometimes been 
caught in significant decision-making and budget-cycle issues. External reports found 
that, without a decision-making body, disputes over support priorities, timelines, 
synchronizing support efforts were sometimes left unresolved. Additionally, each 
stakeholder has different budget processes and approval timelines. If separate programs 
had to occur sequentially or simultaneously, a failed funding request from one 
stakeholder could threaten another country’s already funded program, and damage the 
coalition’s overall effort in that sector.111 
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3. The Key Coordination Node 
In this semi-formal coalition, the Country Team is the key international 
coordination node. This is the level where strategic planning and operational execution 
meet. Each Country Team is composed of a variety of professionals, experts, and 
technical specialists, who were able to interact with their international counterparts on a 
weekly or daily basis. This relatively easy and frequent interaction allowed the 
international community to work closely in analyzing the various problems and develop 
potential solutions. For example, the U.S., UK, EU, Turkey, and UN military 
representatives met during and also outside the official monthly Military Technical 
Working Group. These representatives were able to synchronize much of their countries’ 
efforts, to ensure that even equipment and training from different stakeholders were 
compatible and complimentary.112 While higher-level military leaders met only quarterly 
with their international counterparts, the military representatives at the country team level 
were able to meet as often as they liked. 
The Country Team/Delegation is also the key internal coordination point for all of 
the various agencies and departments/ministries within that country. Each Country Team/
Delegation had officers from across the government’s departments/ministries, who 
specialized on the various assistance sectors: political, humanitarian aid, military/police, 
justice, economic development, infrastructure, and human rights. These officers were 
able to collaborate with one another, in order to develop a more comprehensive national 
assistance strategy, with supporting programs. For example, Country Team officers 
working on security sector assistance programs often collaborated with the officers 
focused on Somalia’s Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) policy 
and strategy. These DDR officers also worked with Economic and humanitarian 
assistance officers, as employment programs or other assistance programs could benefit 
the DDR’s reintegration strategy. The Country Team’s Public Affairs Office was 
involved as well, as messaging was essential to building a successful and credible DDR 
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program, and all programs had to support the political policies and messages.113 Using 
the U.S. as an example, Figure 8 shows how the U.S. Somalia Unit (the U.S.’ diplomatic 
team to Somalia) is the central coordination point for the U.S. inter-agency and 
international community. The Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) 
was allowed to attend the Military Technical Working Group, but only after coordinating 
with the U.S. Somalia Unit.114 
 
Figure 8.   Country teams as coordination nodes in Somalia  




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41
IV. DRC CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the third-largest country 
geographically on the African continent. Despite its enormous mineral wealth, its 
population is one of the poorest in the world. The DRC still suffers from the effects of its 
past dictatorship that has lasted decades and an on-going civil war, which has devastated 
its social and humanitarian situation. On the UN’s Index of Human Development (HDI 
2013), the DRC’s position is 186 out of 187 states.115 Since 1998, at least four million 
people have died in the DRC directly from war, as well as war’s indirect effects, such as 
malnutrition, plagues, and epidemics. Exasperating DRC’s problems was the arrival of 
approximately two million Rwandan refugees, who fled across the Congolese border, and 
the 1996 and 1998 incursions of Rwandan and Ugandan rebel strike forces. Moreover, 
between 1998 and 2002, several groups of Congolese rebels, as well as soldiers from at 
least six other countries, fought each other for power over the country’s mineral wealth.  
The current crisis in the DRC cannot be completely understood without 
knowledge of its post-colonial history. During the decolonization period, the Belgian 
Congo attained its independence in 1960. Just days after the declaration of independence, 
disorder broke out nationwide. In response, but without the agreement of the Congolese 
Government, Belgium sent its troops into the DRC to protect its Belgian nationals. The 
UN accused Belgium of acting as an aggressor, and the Security Council called upon 
Belgium to withdraw its troops from the DRC. Though not even a year old, the DRC was 
compelled to request the help of the UN, and in response, the UN authorized the creation 
of the Congo Opération des Nations Unites au Congo (ONUC) on July 12, 1960.116 Four 
years later, the military phase of ONUC ended; however, the UN civilian-led 
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humanitarian assistance continued, operating with nearly 2000 experts at its peak.117  It 
wasn’t until the late 1990s that an international coalition re-emerged and attempted to 
assist DRC in stabilizing the country. 
This case study will focus on this most recent coalition effort in the DRC’s 
decades-long history of instability and international assistance. Today, the DRC has one 
of the largest peacekeeping operations in the world, with almost 20,000 personnel on the 
ground. Several countries and international organizations now work to assist DRC across 
a broad array of sectors: Security, Justice, Governance, Economy, and Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Analysis into this case will provide insight 
into how this coalition functions, and how the military roles have changed and evolved.   
B. EARLY ASSISTANCE 
Since DRC’s independence in 1960, the UN has tried to find ways to stabilize the 
country. During the Cold War, the UN was caught between the east-west conflicts, which 
limited its effectiveness to act in Africa. The UN’s efforts in DRC did not begin in 
earnest until August 31, 1998, when the Security Council made a simple call for peace.118 
After the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999, between the DRC and its five 
neighbor States (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe), the Security 
Council established the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Republique 
Democratique du Congo (MONUC), via UNSC Resolution 1279. MONUC’s initial 
mandate was to only observe the ceasefire and disengagement of forces, as well as to 
liaison with all parties of the Ceasefire Agreement. The Council then expanded the 
mandate to include the supervision and implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement. 
After the first elections on July 30, 2006, MONUC remained on the ground and 
continued to implement political, military, rule of law, and capacity-building tasks, as 
well as attempting to resolve ongoing conflicts in several DRC provinces.119 
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Maintaining the peace in the DRC proved to be too difficult for the UN forces, 
particularly in the Ituri province, and the UN was forced to ask for additional assistance. 
The EU answered the UN’s request, by authorizing the deployment of the EU Interim 
Emergency Multi-National Force (IEMF). This force consisted of approximately 230 
French and Swiss Special Forces and 1000 French regular army soldiers.120 Under 
Operation ARTEMIS, the IEMF deployed to Bunia to assist the UN in re-establishing 
security in the region. As the name implies, the IEMF was only a temporary mission to 
assist the UN’s MONUC effort. It was also the EU’s first independent military mission 
outside of Europe. Although the IEMF was assisting the UN mission, the EU insisted on 
maintaining control of its force.121 As depicted in Figure 9, the UN and EU controlled 
their own forces, and would, in theory, coordinate with one another at the strategic and 
operational levels. 
 
Figure 9.  Coalition construct in DRC, during MONUC–IEMF 
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Like all semi-formal coalitions, the success of this coalition would depend heavily 
on lateral coordination at both the strategic and operational levels. At the operational 
level, the two military forces coordinated closely with one another. Unfortunately, since 
the EU viewed this DRC deployment as only a temporary military operation, the EU sent 
no civilian representative. As a result, it fell on the IEMF military commander to 
coordinate with the UN’s Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). At the 
strategic level, there was little coordination. After accepting the UN mission request, the 
EU did little to coordinate or synchronize a unified strategy. As a result, the two 
operations were largely viewed as disjointed efforts, which damaged the effectiveness of 
the overall coalition effort.122  
Shortly after the EU completed its first mission to the DRC, the UN again 
requested the EU’s assistance, in March 2006. The EU again deployed a military force, 
this time called the EU Force to the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD 
CONGO), for a four-month election support mission. As in earlier deployments, the EU 
sent no civilian representative to manage the EU’s overall efforts, and a semi-formal 
coalition was formed, with both the UN and EU maintaining control of their forces. 
However, instead of coordinating laterally at both the strategic and operational levels, the 
EU created a single, formalized coordination process, outlined in the EU Council Joint 
Action message.123 Any MONUC request to EUFOR could not go directly from 
commander to commander. Instead, the request had to be routed from MONUC (in the 
DRC) to the UN (in New York) to the EU (in Brussels) to the EUFOR Headquarters (in 
Germany), and then finally to EUFOR (in the DRC).124 This formalized request process 
greatly inhibited EUFOR’s ability to adapt and respond to events on the ground.125 
Figure 10 shows this coordination process overlapped on the coalition structure. 
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Figure 10.  Coalition construct in DRC, during MONUC–EUFOR 
C. MATURING COALITION 
In April 2005, the DRC government asked the European Union for security sector 
support. This led to a bi-lateral agreement between the DRC and EU, and the creation of 
the European Union Security Mission—Republique Democratique du Congo (EUSEC 
RD Congo) and the European Union Police Mission—Republique Democratique du 
Congo (EUPOL RD Congo). Combined, these two missions consisted of only 40 EU 
advisors, who partnered with DRC police and military. This represented a major shift in 
the EU’s assistance approach to the DRC, as the EU was no longer just committing larger 
units for short-term peacekeeping operations, but rather committing specialized advisors 
to a long-term Security Sector Reform (SSR) effort and long-term stability improvement. 
EUPOL provides “assistance, mentoring, support and advice to the Congolese 
authorities for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the fields of policing and its interaction 
with the justice system. It also operates in cross-cutting areas of SSR, particularly human 
rights, gender, the protection of children in armed conflicts, and the fight against 
impunity for sexual violence.”126 EUSEC aimed to assist and integrate the military and 
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governmental leadership, in order to improve the DRC’s overall security sector 
performance. While there were other international stakeholders providing security sector 
assistance, EUSEC RD Congo was the only organization fully dedicated to reforming the 
military and security sector in the DRC.127 
Along with EUPOL and EUSEC, the EU Delegation was also sent to the DRC, 
providing diplomatic representation for the EU in the DRC. The EU Delegation would 
also manage any EU assistance that fell outside the EUPOL or EUSEC mandates.128 
Unfortunately, while the EU was now taking a more holistic assistance approach, the EU 
managed these various efforts back in Brussels, rather than by a single EU leader located 
in the DRC. Figure 11 displays the three distinct EU efforts in the DRC. The coalition 
was still semi-formal in design, so the EU Delegation, EUSEC, and EUPOL did 
coordinate with their international counterparts. However, the EU continued to insist on 
centralizing all of the strategic planning efforts in Europe. 
 
Figure 11.  Coalition construct in the DRC, beginning in 2006. 
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D. CURRENT COALITION 
In 2010, MONUC was replaced by the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations 
Unies pour la stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO), which 
would eventually grow to become the largest UN peace mission in the world. Currently, 
it is comprised of 20,000 soldiers, 715 military observers, 1,200 UN policemen, 
approximately 1000 civilian special envoys, as well as 600 UN volunteers and 2,800 
local employees. In March 2013, the UN Security Council decided to establish an 
Intervention Brigade, consisting of three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, a 
Special Force battalion, and a Reconnaissance Company to combat armed groups of 
rebels in Eastern Congo.129   
While MONUC focused mainly on “supervision” and “implementation” of the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the new MONUSCO mission was authorized to “use all 
necessary means to carry out its mandate relating ... to the protection of civilians, 
humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical 
violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace 
consolidation efforts.”130  
The EU and UN remain the two major stakeholders, in that they are managing the 
largest assistance efforts on the ground, and are driving the overall strategy. However, in 
recent years, there have been an increasing number of “minor” stakeholders. These 
stakeholders are considered minor, not because their contributions are minor, but rather 
because they are not trying to drive the coalition’s strategy or structure. Instead, they are 
only collaborating with the EU and UN to determine how they can contribute to the 
coalition effort, in a manner that supports both the coalition’s interests, as well as their 
own interests. These contributions usually come as either direct assistance to the UN or 
EU, or a bi-lateral program with the DRC that fills a gap in the coalition’s overall 
strategy.   
                                                 
129 United Nations, “MONUSCO.” 
130 Ibid. 
 48
For example, the U.S. has become MONUSCO’s largest financial donor, as the 
interests of the U.S. and UN are mostly mutually supporting in this area.131 The U.S. 
State Department has also filled gaps in overall coalition strategy, by providing over 
$254-million in assistance programs, spanning good governance, agricultural 
development, natural resource management, military professionalism, basic service 
delivery, small business loans, grants, and conflict resolution.132 Similarly, Belgium used 
its historical political influence to assist the coalition in developing a DDR program with 
the DRC government. Belgium helped in the planning efforts, but did not actually fund 
the DDR program. This was done through a different organization and program, the 
Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP).133 The current 
coalition construct, as displayed in Figure 12, shows the two major stakeholders with 
their coordination mechanisms, and the supporting minor stakeholders. 
 
Figure 12.  Current coalition construct in the DRC 
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Most members of the coalition realize that the root causes of the DRC’s instability 
can only be solved with a holistic approach, including political decentralization, reform 
of the security sector, reconciliation, and democratization. One of its current challenges is 
getting the DRC to fully embrace this approach and develop its own holistic strategy, 
similar to that of Mali’s PRED or the Somalia Compact. Such a strategy would give the 
DRC greater responsibility and develop an accountability and assessment mechanism. 
E. ANALYSIS 
1. Stakeholders and National Interests 
The UN and the EU, being major IGOs, seem to be two of the few stakeholders 
truly focused on making permanent improvements in this fragile state. Other ambitious 
members of the international community are more self-interested, wanting to gain access 
to the DRC’s raw materials, without worrying about its long-term ramifications. The 
available mineral wealth in the DRC draws enormous economic interest; and this interest 
is not always in the best interest of the DRC. 
Currently, the most important partner for the DRC is the European Union. Beyond 
the security assistance provided by EUSEC and EUPOL, the European Union is also an 
important partner in the DRC’s political and the economic development. From 2008–
2013, approximately one billion euros was set-aside for the DRC by the EU’s European 
Development Fund. The major focus areas in the EU’s Development and Cooperation 
Program are good governance, public finance management, infrastructure, health care, 
and private sector development. The DRC also represents a potentially lucrative source of 
oil and gas, if Europe is able to develop the DRC’s oil industry.134 
Because the African Union has a broad range of goals and principles, including 
the promotion of democratic principles, human rights, good governance, peace, security, 
and stability, the African Union normally takes an active role in major assistance efforts 
in Africa. However, in the case of the DRC, the AU’s participation has remained 
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strangely limited. Though the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) can order the 
deployment of peacekeeping missions, and recommend military measures to the 
Assembly of the Heads of State, in order to restore peace and security, the AU has 
decided to act mainly in a supporting role to the UN’s MONUSCO effort. The last 
session of the PSC highlights this position, by recording that “The most decisive role for 
the DRC is played by the United Nations Security Council with its efforts to enhance 
regional economic cooperation, bilateral and multilateral partners to support the ongoing 
actions in this field, and looks forward to the outcome of the Follow-up Ministerial 
Conference scheduled to take place in Brussels, from July 1–2, 2014, under the auspices 
of the United Nations, the AU and the World Bank.”135 
In addition to these three international organizations, there are several state 
stakeholders involved in the DRC, all of whom are pursuing their own national interests. 
These national interests sometimes support one another, and other times contradict one 
another. For some stakeholders, like the U.S., the national interests support the EU and 
UN efforts, and are beneficial for the DRC. U.S. foreign policy is focused on regional 
stability, the DRC’s economic importance as a source of global mineral commodities, 
democracy and governance, human rights abuses against women, and the conflict mineral 
trade.136 Secretary of State John Kerry said that achieving a lasting peace in Congo is a 
“high-level priority” with “very significant stakes.”137 While the U.S. has no major 
ground efforts, like EUSEC, in the DRC, the U.S. is using other diplomatic, economic, 
and legal tools to assist the coalition effort. For example, the Dodd-Frank Financial 
Reform Act requires any company that might be using conflict minerals to register itself 
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with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and then disclose its supply chain.138 
Valuable minerals like cassiterite, wolframite, coltan, and gold, used to be extracted from 
Eastern Congo, and passed through a variety of intermediaries before being purchased by 
multinational electronics companies.139 These profits fueled various warlord and rebel 
groups in the DRC. With the Dodd-Frank Act, western tech companies could now be 
exposed as supporters of these warlords and their atrocities. Many companies, seeking to 
avoid such negative publicity, abandoned any supply chains that led back to the DRC or 
West Africa. As a result, more than two-thirds of DRC mines once controlled by warlords 
have closed.140  
Other stakeholders are pursuing interests that do not support the international 
effort or the DRC. The DRC’s relations with its eastern neighbors, Rwanda and Uganda, 
have been historically tense, as both Rwanda and Uganda have been accused of 
supporting multiple rebel groups, including the infamous M23 rebel group. M23 grew out 
of the DRC’s Congrès National Pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), and is still active in 
the Kivu area.141 There have even been several recent occasions in which the DRC and 
Rwandan armies have clashed in the border regions.142 
China is also interested in building economic ties, and is extremely committed to 
expanding its foreign economic markets. While China has built road and rail systems 
from Kinshasa inland, these transportation systems exist solely to tap into the Congolese 
mineral wealth. Since 2005, the Chinese have been securing considerable quantities of 
raw materials, by allocating credits for infrastructure projects in the country.143 These 
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economic agreements have benefited China tremendously, while doing little to build a 
stable and self-sufficient economy for the DRC.144 
2. Semi-Formal Coalition Structure  
As in the previous case studies, national interests were again the major driving 
force in shaping the coalition structure. Though the UN was the leading stakeholder 
initially, it accepted a semi-formal coalition construct, in order to appease the EU’s desire 
for autonomy. A formalized coalition, under a UN command, might instead have driven 
the EU away. 
While a semi-formal structure is more accommodating to stakeholders, this 
structure is only effective if the stakeholders voluntarily work together. In this case, many 
of the other stakeholders had national interests that did not align with those of the 
coalition. This is especially evident with the DRC’s neighbors. Rwanda and Uganda have 
supported rival groups in the DRC, and have even launched their own incursions across 
the DRC’s borders.145 Other countries only seek to exploit the DRC’s mineral wealth, 
which does little for the DRC’s long-term stability. It therefore seems that realistically, 
there were few options for the coalition, other than a semi-formal construct. A formal 
coalition may have fallen apart, or the self-interested stakeholders might have never 
joined in the first place. The semi-formal construct would at least allow stakeholders to 
collaborate. 
While the major coalition stakeholders did collaborate, the EU, unfortunately, 
compartmentalized its assistance efforts. As shown in the current coalition construct 
(Figure 12), the EU created separate missions for each major assistance effort, yet did not 
link these efforts under a unified leadership (whether military or civilian). MONUSCO, 
on the other hand, managed all of the UN programs, under the leadership of the SRSG. 
The EU’s stove-piped structure created an imbalance in the coalition structure, and is 
responsible for many of the coordination issues within the coalition. 
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3. The Key Coordination Node 
As highlighted in the previous case studies, the Country Team or Delegation 
should be the key coordination node, given this stakeholder environment and semi-formal 
coalition construct. However, this case study illustrates the problems that occur when the 
stakeholders avoid using this coordination node or, in some instances, insist on 
formalized coordination processes. 
The initial coalition strategic coordination effort was pretty dismal. After 
answering the UN’s request for assistance, the EU made no real coordination effort at the 
strategic level. The lack of the EU Delegation also greatly hurt the coalition’s 
coordination effort, and as a result, no unified strategy was ever developed. Additionally, 
no governance, security, economic, and other experts were able to collaborate with one 
another. Military ground commanders were left to pursue avenues of informal 
coordination, in an attempt to offset this lack of strategy.  
The coordination process swung to the other extreme, when the EUFOR RD 
CONGO deployed, and the EU insisted on a highly formalized and hierarchical 
coordination process. Even if the EU had a delegation present in the DRC, this formal 
coordination process would have rendered the delegation ineffective. The coordination 
process was criticized widely for making the EU unresponsive to changing events, and 
greatly hindered lateral collaboration.146 
During this time period, the UN did attempt to create coordination mechanisms to 
improve stakeholder collaboration. In one attempt, MONUC created a Joint Mission 
Assessment Cell (JMAC), but failed to invite any of the non-governmental organizations 
or many of the other stakeholders. Not surprisingly, by not including all of the 
stakeholders, the JMAC was rendered ineffective and was soon abandoned.147 MONUC 
also created a SSR Coordination Center, which included a steering committee and 
technical advisors. Unfortunately, many of the stakeholders rejected this Coordination 
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Center, believing it to be too restrictive and disruptive to their national interests. Like the 
JMAC, the Coordination Center was also abandoned.148 
Since the creation of MONUSCO, the EU and UN have made some progress in 
improving their lateral coordination. There is now a EU Delegation in the DRC that can 
communicate directly with MONUSCO and the SRSG. Additionally, the EU has updated 
its Common Security and Defense Plan (CSDP). The CSDP now stresses the need for a 
habitual relationship with the UN, in order to improve EU-UN coordination for all 
peacekeeping operations and crisis management operations.149   
While the EU and UN are now emphasizing the need for improved coordination 
at the strategic level, this desire has not translated to a unified coalition strategy or 
synchronized operations in the DRC. Meike Froitzheim and Fredrik Söderbaum 
highlighted this specific shortfall in their study of the DRC.150 In a separate study, Alexis 
Arieff and Thomas Coen echoed this same point stating, “It is difficult to document clear 
signs of structural improvements in the security sector; however, and donor efforts appear 
to have been challenged by a lack of strategic planning and coordination; conflicting 
policy goals, structural reform versus the negotiated settlement of conflicts through 
integration; limited justice sector capacity; and limited political will and 
sustainability.”151 Froitzheim and Söderbaum further elaborated, by stating that the 
coalition could produce a more unified strategy and synchronized effort if the EU and UN 
would reexamine their structural relationship, and empower their DRC-based leaders and 
experts to plan and implement strategy and programs.152 
While the coalition effort in this case study has been consistently plagued by poor 
coordination, it is interesting to see that only the UN used an integrated and empowered 
                                                 
148 Ibid., 44. 
149 Tobias Pietz, “Die EU und das UN-Peacekeeping : Halbzeit bei Brüssels Aktionsplan,” Zentrum 
für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, October 2013, 3, www.zif-berlin.org. 
150 Meike Froitzheim and Söderbaum, Fredrik, “The Limits of the EU as a Peace and Security Actor 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Africa Spectrum 46, no. 3 (2011): 45–70. 
151 Arieff and Coen, “R43166,” 12. 
152 Froitzheim and Söderbaum, Fredrik, “The Limits of the EU as a Peace and Security Actor in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 45. 
 55
Delegation (i.e., Country Team). As the UN effort changed from a military effort to a 
holistic effort, the UN developed what they called an Integrated Mission Concept. Based 
on this concept, coordination and decision-making authorities were pushed down to the 
Delegation level. In late 2004, the Deputy SRSG took on additional duties to better 
synchronize military, political, developmental, and humanitarian efforts. While this 
concept still had some difficulties in execution, this case makes clear that the integrated 
concept served the UN well in coordinating its own efforts, especially when compared to 
the EU approach. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
States and their militaries are operating in a different international environment 
than those of the past; and within this environment, a new coalition construct has 
emerged. In fact, this environment and coalition construct may not just be limited to the 
African continent. The growing international coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) currently shows the same coalition characteristics illustrated in this study 
– several stakeholders, with partially divergent national interests, trying to cooperate and 
collaborate in a semi-formal coalition in order to develop and execute a holistic strategy. 
This study began with the basic premise that if the international environment and 
the resulting coalition structure have changed, then the military’s system of integration 
should also change. This thesis then sought to better understand the new international 
environment and resulting coalition constructs, specifically as they relate to stability 
operations and other long-term coalition efforts in Africa. Our research found that the 
Country Team (or Diplomatic Delegation) is the critical node for coordination and 
collaboration, especially for holistic coalition efforts. In this new coalition construct, the 
military can improve its effectiveness by more thoroughly integrating planning and 
coordination efforts into the Country Team. 
A. STAKEHOLDERS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Each case study illustrated the importance of national interests in the international 
environment. National interests are the driving force in the formation and longevity of a 
coalition. As national interests change, stakeholder participation in long-term assistance 
efforts and stability operations can be expected to vary as well. Moreover, coalition 
stakeholders will not always share mutual interests. Sometimes, they may possess 
competing or opposing interests. This dominance of national interests creates a complex 
international environment for the coalition and its potential stakeholders, which must be 
constantly navigated by the stakeholders’ Foreign Affairs Components (e.g. Department 
of State or Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
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B. SEMI-FORMAL COALITIONS 
In response to this complex environment and stakeholder challenges, international 
coalitions are increasingly adopting a semi-formal construct. The semi-formal structure 
provides the flexibility necessary to attract and retain stakeholders in a coalition. 
Stakeholders can avoid overcommitting politically, or losing control of their resources 
and forces to a coalition command. Moreover, stakeholders can participate in a coalition 
without first coming to a formal agreement over issues like national caveats, coalition 
command and control, or administrative structure and procedures. In return, the host 
nation and stakeholders can all benefit from the combined effects of a coalition effort. 
This also allows the coalition to be more flexible and adaptive to the changing 
environment and conflict. 
A semi-formal coalition’s flexibility stems from its combination of multi-lateral 
coordination and bi-lateral execution. Through multi-lateral coordination, stakeholders 
can develop a coalition strategy and synchronize international efforts. Larger 
stakeholders can provide a broad range of assistance, while smaller stakeholders can find 
niches of assistance. Together, these assistance efforts create a more complete holistic 
approach that can more effectively target the root causes of the host nation’s instability. 
At the same time, bi-lateral execution allows stakeholders to maintain autonomy to 
ensure that their national interests are being furthered. As a result, even as stakeholders 
and their assistance efforts change over time, the overall coalition effort can continue. 
C. KEY COORDINATION NODE 
In these semi-formal coalitions, the stakeholder’s Country Team/Delegation 
becomes the key coordination node. Dialogue and coordination at the national and 
ministerial levels of government are important. However, at these levels, international 
coordination cannot occur on a sufficiently frequent basis. Instead, it is Country Teams, 
led by Ambassadors that conduct the high-frequency meetings and coordination. They are 
able to navigate through the various stakeholder interests and international politics, to 
develop actual coalition consensus and strategy, while ensuring their national interests are 
being addressed. 
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The multi-agency representation inside the Country Team allows the Country 
Team to discuss strategy and assistance efforts across security, governance, economic, 
humanitarian, and other sectors. Country Team experts are able to collaborate directly 
with their international counterparts. The Mali case study illustrates how a few major 
stakeholders were able to coordinate directly with one another, while the Somalia case 
study illustrates how the coalition can develop a few semi-formal coordinating 
mechanisms to bring experts from several stakeholders together. Conversely, the DRC 
case study illustrated the problems that arise when the Country Team is circumvented by 
a more rigid and formal coordination mechanism. Whether accomplished directly or 
through semi-formal mechanisms, the majority of the detailed collaboration and 
synchronization between stakeholders in such coalitions is now occurring at the Country 
Team level. 
The case studies also revealed that the Country Team is the key internal 
coordination node for each stakeholder. Since the Country Team has multi-agency 
representation, they are able to function as a true interagency organization. Aside from 
the national level, there are almost no other points where interagency experts and 
professionals are assigned together and able to interact on a daily basis.153 
In addition to its importance for international and internal coordination, the 
Country Team also has access to the host-nation government and intimate knowledge of 
the problem and conflict at hand. Moreover, the Country Team is frequently the most 
lasting form of stakeholder representation in a host nation. While the military, and other 
agencies might have sporadic deployments or engagements to that country, the Country 
Team is a permanent fixture. Finally, Country Teams have diplomatic authorities and are 
responsible for overseeing all of the stakeholder’s efforts in the host nation. No other 
government entity can claim the same capabilities, knowledge, and access. 
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D. INTEGRATING INTO THE COUNTRY TEAM 
Currently, militaries generally create their own strategies and plans separately, but 
“in coordination with” (as commonly stated in doctrine) the Country Team. We 
recommend integrating military planning directly into the Country Team. Integrating 
military planning efforts into the Country Team gives the military an increased ability to 
coordinate and collaborate with the rest of the interagency and its international 
counterparts. While militaries do make efforts to collaborate with other militaries 
directly, the Country Team seems to offer the highest frequency of interaction and, more 
importantly, interaction with military representatives focused on the same conflict. 
Interagency collaboration would allow the military to employ its forces more 
economically, by leveraging the expertise and capabilities of the other agencies. As 
shown by these case studies, stakeholders are leveraging their Foreign Affairs Economic 
Sections, Treasury Departments, and Foreign Aid and Development organizations to 
develop much more powerful economic programs than the military could ever achieve. In 
each case study, there are multi-million dollar economic and development programs. If 
the military were integrated into the Country Team, it could help shape these programs to 
better support military objectives and develop better military efforts to support these 
programs. 
These case studies also showed that certain assistance programs do not fall solely 
under the purview of one agency or department. DDR, for example, is neither solely a 
security/defense matter nor solely a civilian matter. In the Somalia case study, a complete 
DDR program is being addressed by military, police, judicial, economic assistance, and 
humanitarian aid experts, because no single sector could fully address the DDR issue. 
We thus recommend increased integration into the Country Team, because the 
Country Team is the “natural” coordination node in this international environment and 
new coalition system. Figure 13 illustrates how the Country Team is the natural 
coordination point between international stakeholders, as well as the stakeholder’s 
interagency. If the military truly wants to integrate its efforts more effectively with its 
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interagency partners and international partners, then the Country Team is the natural 
point to do so. 
 
Figure 13.  Country team as the key coordination node 
Interestingly, three prominent U.S. leaders – Dennis Blair (former Director of the 
U.S. National Intelligence), Ronald Neumann (former U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, 
Bahrain, and Afghanistan) and Eric Olson (former Commander of U.S. Special 
Operations Command) – came to the same conclusion in an August 27, 2014 article in 
which they explored the internal bureaucratic challenges in current U.S. approaches to 
assisting fragile states. In their article, they argued that interagency integration at the 
Country Team, coupled with increased Country Team authorities and responsibilities, 
would reduce interagency friction and produce more effective holistic U.S. strategies.154  
Country Teams, if manned and supported properly, could produce a plan “that is 
balanced between the short and the long term, that includes the most effective 
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applications of the capabilities of the different departments and that realistically matches 
the needs on the ground.”155  The authors go on to elaborate how the Country Team 
could produce more realistic and effective plans, best react to changing ground 
conditions, and better integrate all of the United States’ capabilities.156 
E. CHALLENGES 
This study revealed three challenges that must be addressed, if militaries are to be 
successful in integrating their planning efforts into Country Teams. The first challenge is 
structural. Most governments currently operate through stove-piped departments, with the 
national executive leadership being the only truly integrated point of government. Below 
this point, the departments, ministries, and agencies develop their own strategies and 
plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level. There is some lateral 
coordination between the departments, but nothing that can be considered truly 
integrated. 
This stove-piped system can be illustrated using the U.S. Department of State and 
Department of Defense as an example. Figure 14 illustrates how the National Security 
Council creates an integrated National Security Strategy. From this strategy, each 
department then creates its own strategies and plans. It is a top-down and largely 













Figure 14.  Current U.S. Planning Structure 
By the time these various plans reach the operational and tactical levels in the host 
nation, U.S. forces and agencies must reconcile the difference between the several plans, 
each with their own policy objectives, strategies, and goals. The U.S. Military’s Joint 
Publication 3–08 on Interorganizational Coordination even recognizes this point, stating, 
“The various [US Government] agencies often have different, and sometimes conflicting, 
goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques, which make unified action a 
challenge.”157  While these plans and strategies are important for the departments and 
agencies to communicate their efforts and use of funding to national leadership and its 
citizens, the current planning system fosters compartmentalized efforts and would likely 
inhibit a Country Team-led integrated planning effort. 
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This friction from competing goals was seen in the US’ planning efforts in 
Somalia. While much of the U.S. interagency planning occurred within the U.S. Somalia 
Unit (the U.S. Country Team to Somalia), the military’s Combined Joint Task Force – 
Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), located in Djibouti, led the military planning effort. Despite 
efforts to coordinate and collaborate, it was clear that CJTF-HOA had different priorities 
than the U.S. Somalia Unit and U.S. State Department. This led to a great deal of 
frustration, especially when CJTF-HOA would brief military proposals that clearly did 
not support the Ambassador’s objectives or Somalia Unit’s Strategy.158 
Whereas the U.S. has created multiple strategies and plans, Germany suffers from 
a lack of military involvement in strategic planning. Germany’s ministerial structure is 
very similar to the U.S.’ department structure that was shown in Figure 13. However, 
Germany, as a matter of policy, is reluctant to use its military as a tool in its own foreign 
security policy. Instead, Germany focuses much of its military’s efforts through the EU 
and NATO.159  As a result, when Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs develops its 
foreign policy, the military effort is frequently not synchronized with its diplomatic, 
economic, and other efforts. Well-developed EU and NATO security strategies contribute 
to Germany’s overall security, and it is commendable that Germany is taking an active 
role in these organizations. However, the need still remains for Germany to incorporate 
its military into its own country specific strategies. 
The second challenge is the planning capability within the Country Team. While 
the Country Team has interagency representation, it does not have a fully developed and 
integrated planning process or planning support staff. As Blair, Neumann, and Olson, 
highlight, Foreign Service Officers possess a great deal of expertise and diplomatic skills. 
However, planning and managerial skills are not stressed or sufficiently developed.160  
This observation is common among all countries and embassies. If the military integrates 
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its planning efforts into the Country Team, the Country Team should develop the 
planning skills and processes to better leverage all of its agencies’ capabilities. Ideally, 
this planning process would be integrated into each agency’s internal planning and 
resourcing processes. Moreover, if the Country Team is to become a more integral player 
in strategy development and execution, then they will likely require further resources for 
improvements in professional development and education. 
Finally, there is a cultural challenge that must be addressed. The military, because 
of its great size and capabilities, prides itself on being proactive and taking a leading role 
in planning. Integrating into the Country Team means that the military must allow the 
civilian leadership to lead the strategic planning efforts. The military must not ‘militarize’ 
the Country Team, because the Country Team is still, at its core, the country’s diplomatic 
representation. 
Militaries have already realized that international collaboration is increasingly 
important, and have taken the initiative to strengthen their relationships with other 
militaries. These improved relationships will enable militaries to better share information, 
lessons learned, and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). Moreover, this initiative 
will open the door for more international training engagements and exercises. However, 
in doing so, militaries need to be cognizant that they are creating parallel coordination 
lines to the Country Teams. While this initiative will improve military knowledge, 
training, and doctrine, militaries should not use these direct communication lines as a 
primary means of strategic planning, as it could contradict the country team’s integrated 
planning efforts. 
While these challenges may seem daunting, they must be addressed if the military 
is to improve its effectiveness in coalitions. The traditional military thinking of coalitions 
is no longer suitable for these new semi-formal coalition constructs. Coalition efforts are 
no longer always military-led, nor solely security focused. Rather, they are holistic 
efforts, focused on long-term reform and stability. These semi-formal coalitions rely on 
country teams to bring a wide range of stakeholders and experts together to develop and 
implement a unified holistic strategy. Country teams are synchronizing both international 
and interagency efforts to provide a holistic assistance effort. The current military system 
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of conducting its own planning, within its own headquarters, fails to maximize the use of 
this natural and critical coordination node. Integration into the country team will allow 
the military to provide valuable advice during strategy development, will improve the 
military’s ability to coordinate its efforts with its interagency and international partners, 
and will ultimately result in more effective coalition efforts. 
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